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PORTS
Europol's analysis of the infiltration modalities of criminal organizations in ports
The report, carried out with ports in Antwerp, Hamburg, Bremerhaven and Rotterdam, illustrates the modus operandi used for illicit traffics
L'Aia
April 6, 2023
Europol, the European Union agency that assists the member states in preventing and combating the forms of organised crime and terrorism, has drawn up the port security committees in Antwerp, Hamburg, Bremerhaven and the European Union. Rotterdam, a joint analysis to assess the threat posed by the infiltration of criminal organisations into EU ports and port activities.
The report highlights the vulnerability of European ports compared to these infiltrations given the very nature of port airports, being open facilities requiring accessibility, 24 hours out of 24 and seven days out of seven, large volumes of shipments of goods and are characterized by increasing levels of automation creating new vulnerability elements. In addition, ports are strongly connected with surrounding areas and with transport infrastructure of all kinds and in port areas and with ports operates a high number of companies and on the port scene countless attachés are present.
The document recalls that in 2021 EU ports handled a total of 3.46 billion tonnes of cargo, with containerized cargo alone-corresponding to 98.1 million cargo containers-which accounted for 25% percent of the traffic. total. In 2020 the twenty major European ports by volume of traffic handled almost 80% percent of all containerized traffic. The report notes that the percentage of containers being inspected is low, having only been controlled about 2% percent of all containers and only 10% percent of containers from South American nations, the director that is particularly used for the trafficking of drugs. The analysis notes that despite the number of seizures increased, the likelihood that containers containing illicit goods will be detected remains low especially in view of the high levels of traffic and the substantial flow daily container at ports in the EU.
The document explains that criminal organizations are interested in operating illicit trafficking in safety, regardless of economic costs, security that depends on the ability of the criminal organisation to successfully circumvent controls customs and police. Therefore ports are also selected on the basis of the possibilities of infiltration and control of port logistics and transport services. The high number of service providers and companies with access to the port area, together with the presence of many peripheral port companies such as forwarders and transporters, provides ample opportunity for the criminal organizations by allowing infiltration into ports, corruption, the creation of shell companies and the sending of illicit goods within the legal commercial flow in order to circumvent customs checks.
The report by Europol and the commissions of the four European ports illustrates how criminal networks organise drug trafficking, for example choosing to hide the drugs in the ship, which is attached to the exterior of the hull or hidden in the containers embarked, drugs that can be recovered before the ship arrives in port or after entering the stopover. For these traffics, criminals use ships of all types of naviglio, including submarines, sailing boats, yachts and fishing vessels. The latter vessels are overused for transporting large quantities of cocaine by being very flexible as they can enter the EU through small tourist porticciols or fishing ports. The document specifies that, however, the largest quantities of narcotic drugs have been found hidden in large merchant vessels headed for Europe, mainly hidden within the containers in which they can be placed inside bags. placed in an easily accessible place of the container or hidden within legal merchandise, or physically incorporated into marble blocks or chemically in fabrics or coal, or even hidden in the same constructive elements as the containers. Once the illicit goods arrive in the port of destination, they are extracted from the container within the port by a dedicated team leaving the port area on foot or on a vehicle, or the goods leave the port within the port containers and are then recovered on the outside of the port area. To organise this traffic the criminal networks make use of data and information obtained from the employees, who allow the choice of shipments that reach the desired destination and are less likely to be inspected and that are carried out by shipping and logistics companies in which there are attachés that criminals can bribe.
The report then explains in detail what are most used by criminals to recover hidden drug lots within the containers and the ways that these use to take advantage of the vulnerabilities of the logistics chain, to example by illegally obtaining the identifying codes of containers needed to withdraw containers at ports. This allows criminals to circumvent the procedures of releasing containers and transport them outside the port area, where the drugs are recovered. Normally criminals obtain codes from corrupt attachés, but sometimes they can resort to hacking or phishing activities. The report points out that, however, corruption is the far more widely used way of criminal organizations to infiltrate the logistics chain and ports.
" The situation in the container ports of Antwerp, Hamburg and Rotterdam and the modus operandi of embezzlement of container identifiers to recover illicit goods from ports-concludes the analysis-clearly illustrate how the networks criminals exploit vulnerabilities in the port environment for the trafficking of illicit goods. Using the immense volumes of goods handled legally on a daily basis and the numerous public and private actors with access to the port and the port-related data systems, criminal groups have found a convenient way to organize "in safety" their traffic operations. Highly linked to the European transport network, these ports provide an opportunity to quickly transport illicit goods to distribution centres across the EU. If not dealt with effectively and efficiently, it is likely that it will increase the use of identifiable codes of subtracted containers and the resulting innovative modus operandi that result from it. Criminal networks will continue to use major ports for traffic and infiltrate through corruption, as long as loopholes in the logistics chain and security procedures will allow it. "
Recalling that "many ports are expanding by adding capacity and speeding up container processing", the report highlights that, " with higher levels of automation in ports and a growing digitalization of procedures of handling of goods, it is necessary to put in place adequate security measures by both public and private partners. The main ports are already trying to tackle the illicit trade in goods with changes in procedures and by developing more secure database systems and are examining innovative technologies that combine imaging and artificial intelligence to increase the percentage of containers and goods subjected to controls. "
The report noted, however, that, " as the EU's main ports increase security, it is likely that the EU's secondary ports will become more attractive to criminal networks. Although the volume of containers passing through the EU's secondary ports is still reduced compared to the EU's main ports-clarifies the document-there is an increasing amount of cocaine trafficking through secondary ports. of the EU, probably due to the less stringent security measures taken. The development of the EU project to link 328 ports to the Trans-European Comprehensive Transport Network (TEN-T) by 2030-warns the Europol report-could strengthen this trend. "
Emphasizing that "infiltration of ports by organised crime poses a serious threat to the legal economy and security of the EU," the report urges that "in EU ports a common approach will be implemented at the level of the EU." European that pays attention to regional aspects to address this threat, as criminal networks continuously seek loopholes in security, adapt their modus operandi or pass from one port to another in search of more favorable conditions for their activities. This requires the strengthening of the resilience of ports to infiltration, as well as preventive and investigative actions. With the further modernization and expansion of many EU ports, it is necessary to pay continuous attention to the integration of the security elements in the design of port infrastructure. This includes the development of legislative initiatives at the European level to streamline security measures at ports, as well as the implementation of public partnerships to involve all port actors essential to countering the infiltration of criminal networks in EU ports. "The implementation of these measures at the European level will ensure a level playing field, preventing competition from happening at the expense of security," the report said.
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