MARAD accusa il Giappone di non aver attuato la riforma portuale promessa

Clyde J. Hart Jr. dell'amministrazione marittima statunitense MARAD non è andato tanto per il sottile. Ieri il rappresentante americano ha infatti accusato senza mezzi termini il governo giapponese di non aver tenuto fede agli impegni assunti due anni fa in tema di riforma portuale. Ospite a Tokyo dell'International Propeller Club del Giappone nell'ambito del primo dei due giorni di incontri richiesti dagli USA proprio per discutere della riforma portuale giapponese, nel suo intervento - che riportiamo di seguito - Hart ha detto che è stato fatto poco per riorganizzare il sistema dei porti nazionali, che sta ulteriormente perdendo traffici a vantaggio di altri scali asiatici meno costosi.

Hart è stato particolarmente critico nei confronti del documento governativo giapponese dello scorso giugno che - ha spiegato - "guarda al passato e non al futuro". Secondo il rappresentante americano infatti è andata perduta un'occasione per introdurre una vera riforma, che liberalizzi i porti nipponici. Il rappresentante di MARAD ritiene invece che la posizione del governo di Tokyo rinforzi il monopolio delle attuali compagnie portuali, ostacolando di fatto l'ingresso di nuovi operatori.

Dopo il meeting in Giappone la delegazione guidata da Hart ha in programma il 18 ottobre un incontro a Seul con le autorità marittime sudcoreane per discutere delle nuove normative coreane sullo shipping e degli accordi bilaterali in campo marittimo raggiunti dalla Corea del Sud con altri paesi asiatici tra cui la Cina.

Remarks by Maritime Administrator
Clyde J. Hart Jr.
International Propeller Club
Tokyo, Japan

October 13, 1999

Open Ports, Open Markets

I am pleased to meet with you this evening on the occasion of my visit to Japan. Japan is a pivotal country in international trade and transportation and the International Propeller Club is a well-known and distinguished body whose members possess great expertise in shipping and trade matters around the globe. Over the years several U.S. Maritime Administrators before me, as well as other U.S. officials, have appeared at this rostrum.

I don't get to Japan often enough and I am glad to be back at this particularly pleasant time of the year. It is surely not a secret that I am here on official business. I will be discussing the port issue with the Japanese government for the next two days. I will have more to say on that in a few minutes. I would like to begin by discussing international aspects of U.S. maritime policy.

It seems to me that, as we move into the 21^st century, the global maritime industry faces an international environment that is growing increasingly responsive to market forces and, paradoxically, that continues to be plagued by government restrictions in key areas of the world. Part of this paradox may arise from differing reactions to the growth of globalization; shipping companies may grasp the implications of increasing interconnection among economies around the globe, but bureaucracies that are accustomed to great power and standing in an economy tend to resist change. Clearly this bureaucratic attitude, where it exists, is a strong negative factor, putting great strain on the resources of commercially operated shipping companies that are accustomed to having both the challenges and the benefits that a free market provides. The financial crisis in Asia and other countries has further complicated the situation.

Under the Clinton Administration, U.S. maritime policy has sought to assure a strong merchant marine to provide national security sealift capability and to support our foreign trade, while continuing to ensure the open market that is the hallmark of the U.S. economy.

The national security component of this policy is driven by knowledge that in national emergencies, no reliable ocean transportation alternative exists to the U.S.-flag fleet of commercial and government reserve ships with U.S. citizen crews. It is recognized that commercially operated ships form an important part of this fleet. If we examine, for example, how military cargo was transported during the Persian Gulf war, we find the following: nearly 80% of military dry cargo transported during that conflict was carried on U.S.-flag ships and more than 30% was carried on commercial U.S. flag ships as part of normal liner operations or under time-charter to the Department of Defense.

In order to provide needed sealift support in the future, the Administration proposed legislation for that purpose that was enacted in 1996 as the Maritime Security Act. This law established the Maritime Security Program, or "MSP", for short. MSP is intended to ensure that an active U.S. merchant fleet and the trained personnel needed to operate both active and reserve vessels, will be available to meet national security requirements for sealift capacity. MSP participants also provide intermodal shipping services and systems. MSP will also ensure the continued presence of U.S. flag shipping in international commerce.

At the same time that we were addressing the need for a more effective national sealift policy, there was increasing attention to the possibility of deregulating liner shipping. After much discussion, debate and hard legislative work over several years, the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 was passed by Congress and signed by the President just about a year ago. "OSRA," as it has come to be known, took effect in May of this year.

At this point it is too early to make definitive judgements about OSRA, although I am sure that everyone who has been affected by it already has an opinion. I believe we should remember, as we look at OSRA, that the new law resulted from a complex legislative process that involved many groups. These included big and small shippers, U.S. and foreign carriers, Japanese carriers among them, U.S. ports, labor unions and transportation intermediaries, as well as foreign governments. It was quite possible that such a legislative process would not have produced a final legislative result at all. The law that did arise from the legislative deliberations was a compromise that may not have been perfect in every last detail. But this much is certain: there has been a clear expansion of competition in the U.S. liner trades. We have to give it a chance to work.

A majority of our trading partners share our belief in free, transparent markets, open ports and nondiscriminatory treatment for all carriers. We would like this standard to become the norm internationally. However, some governments do not trust the results that the free market produces in the maritime sector. In those cases a situation may arise where a foreign government restricts the access of our carriers to its shipping markets while its own national carriers enjoy full access to the market in the United States. In such instances it is incumbent on us to seek removal of the barriers that are imposed on our carriers, so that we can establish reciprocal treatment for them. Reciprocity is our guiding principle.

It goes without saying that the Federal Maritime Commission, through its enforcement of U.S. maritime trade laws, has played an essential role in dealing with the problems encountered by our carriers in foreign markets. Over the years, the Commission, now under the able leadership of Chairman Hal Creel, has carried out its responsibilities as an independent regulatory agency in a highly professional and responsible manner.

In actions that involved both Executive Branch agencies and the FMC, the United States has successfully negotiated-I would emphasize that word: negotiated-removal of restrictions that foreign governments unilaterally imposed on U.S. foreign maritime trades. As a result of these efforts, long lists of restrictions on intermodal operations that had been in force in Taiwan and Korea were removed several years ago. In addition, through a similar process we have expanded the scope of shipping and related landside activities for U.S. carriers in China. However, in China much still remains to be done before we can say that a market-based situation exists in our maritime trade. These are highlights. There are also many smaller problems that are solved by working with our embassies abroad.

I would like to turn now to the question of port reform in Japan. In dealing with this country, we observe the contradiction between its standing as an international trade and economic giant, as a representative of much that is modern in the export of goods, on the one hand, and its antiquated, inefficient port system that is protected from competition and, in effect, creates a hidden tax on every import and export, on the other. Japan's port operations are among the most heavily regulated, expensive and inflexible in the world. Japanese port regulations include measures that require a burdensome and restrictive license procedure for new entrant companies seeking to set up stevedoring or general contracting firms. They specify the minimum number of workers and equipment each stevedoring firm must employ. And they support an arbitrary, time-consuming and non-transparent

process, known as "prior consultation," that is enforced by the Japan Harbor Transport Association. As you may know, prior consultation requires negotiation of any significant change in a shipping company's operations.

It is important that I assure you that I am not here to lecture about the port problem. It is your system. But I would like to provide what I consider important information about the U.S. view of this issue. The U.S. economy and therefore the U.S. government have important interests that are affected by the way goods are handled as they move through ports and harbors around the world. This is especially true of ports in Japan, given its role as a major trading partner and a transshipment hub. It is surely superfluous to point out that the JHTA's prior consultation regime is imposed unilaterally on foreign shipping companies and that these companies are in a weak position in trying to cope with its demands. If you view the problem in this way, you would not be surprised at the continuing U.S. interest in the issue of port reform here, including both Executive Branch agencies and the FMC.

I hasten to say that foreign carriers are not the only ones that suffer from the inefficient port system. It also affects workers in Japan's ports by driving ships away to lower-cost harbors elsewhere in Asia. The Japanese government's White Paper on Shipping notes that the number of liner ships calling at Japan's major ports fell from more than 100 a week in 1994 to 80 a week in 1998. At the same time, liner calls per week rose in Singapore and Hong Kong. This is a trend that is likely to continue as long as the present system continues to prevail.

In 1997, the United States and Japan negotiated a package of undertakings that, when implemented, would open up the ports in this country to non-Japanese companies, creating competitive conditions that would benefit both trading and transportation interests. Regrettably, the Japanese government has done little to improve the situation in the ports in the intervening two years. The improvements in the prior consultation system agreed to in 1997 have not been fully implemented, and prior consultation remains an onerous burden for doing business. In addition, Japanese ports are open on Sundays only by special agreement for limited work. Japanese labor unions have also threatened to shut down any U.S. carrier who applies for a stevedoring license or tries an alternative to the prior consultation system. Meanwhile, the Japanese government has refused to commit itself in advance to take any action in the event of such an illegal work stoppage.

Last June the Japanese government issued a final report on deregulation of the port transport business sector. In our view the preparation of this document offered a great opportunity for systematic overhaul of Japan's port service regime. It could have been a blueprint for reform that would finally open Japan's ports to the free market.

Not this document. Not this final report. This is a paper that looks to the past, not the future, one that will preserve the position of the current companies by setting up insurmountable obstacles to new entrants. While we welcome elimination of the supply-demand requirement in the ports sector, the minor changes proposed in the final report will not motivate port operators to provide better service or lower rates, because there is no competitive incentive to do so. In fact, the proposed measures will increase expenses by raising the minimum number of port workers per stevedoring company by fifty percent. The final report also proposes that carriers cooperate by making voluntary direct contributions to the Port Modernization Promotion Council (PMPC) to support pension, welfare, and other benefits, that they had no part in negotiating, for union workers employed by JHTA member companies. None of these changes are likely to encourage shipping companies to increase their port calls in Japan.

U.S. government and industry recognize Japanese union workers' contributions to port operations. In fact, most U.S. port workers are unionized. Stevedoring and other port service companies of any nationality may compete freely with each other for business. This competition helps create jobs, not destroy them. At the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, the two busiest U.S. container ports, total container throughput increased from 5.1 million TEU to 7.5 million between 1994 and 1998. And union longshore employment at Los Angeles and Long Beach also increased from fewer than 3,000 workers in 1994 to nearly 4,000 in 1998. In fact, many U.S. ports are planning to expand because their current facilities cannot handle expected increases in business.

The choice is clear. Japan can maintain its current system, attempt to preserve its existing port jobs, and watch the rest of the world sail by to less costly destinations. Or it can embrace reform and develop the kind of first-class port services that such a great trading nation and its trading partners deserve and have a right to expect. Japan has often publicly supported liberalization of international shipping in forums such as APEC and the WTO. Knowing what we know about the Japanese port regime, many of us are skeptical of such assertions. As we approach the beginning of a new millennium, the world will be watching to see if Japan will carry out the task of opening its own port services business, which is so vital to Japan and to international trade.

I don't know how much time we have, but I will be happy to answer a few questions.