The Suez Canal continues to deal with deep geopolitical and economic readjustments linked to instability of the Middle East, although the latest data recorded during the 2026 show a gradual and prudent return of trade along the historic maritime route. Traffic data in fact, show a progressive rise compared to the collapses reached between 2024 and 2025, while remaining far from the glories of the pre-crisis period.

In September of this year, the canal a total of 1,352 ships, with an increase of +17.4% on the September 2025, of which 582 tankers (+29.0%) and 770 other units (+9.8%), for a total SCNT net tonnage of €72.5 million of tons (+51.0%).

Between July and September 2026, the Egyptian channel recorded a total of 4,050 ship transits, up +23.6% on the third quarter of last year, of which 1,688 oil tankers (+30.5%) and 2,362 other ships (+19.1%), reaching a total net tonnage of 203.8 million tons (+47.5%).

In the first nine months of 2026, total maritime traffic was 10,954 transits, up +17.4% on the same period of 2025, of which 4,602 oil tankers (+25.7%) and 6,352 other type (+12.0%).

If the third quarter of this year showed the most significant acceleration of the year, driven by the cautious return of some major shipping companies on the routes of Suez, however, the volume of transits continues to be far away from that of the pre-crisis period, before the geopolitical crisis radically changed global shipping routes. In the third quarter of 2023, for example, there were 6,523 ships transited against 4,050 in the same period of 2026. Despite the signs and the increase recorded at the beginning of the current autumn, the overall volumes of maritime traffic therefore travel still at a level about 35-40% lower than the historical parameters prior to the blockades of ship traffic in the Sea Started from the end of 2023. Following the conflict that broke out in the Middle East at the end of 2023, in fact, the Yemeni Houthi movement has launched a systematic campaign of attacks with drones, missiles and armed teams against ships in transit through the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, with new waves of tension also recorded at the end of the summer of 2026.

The crisis in the Red Sea is not an isolated event, but it is part of the broader strategic and geopolitical confrontation pitting Iran, its regional allies (including the Houthis) and the US-led coalition. This context of hybrid warfare has made the entire area a highly volatile, fueling the risks of escalation also in the Strait of Hormuz and altering global oil, gas and energy flows. To avoid ballistic risks and prohibitive insurance costs against the risks of war, the vast majority of companies has chosen, and in part continues to prefer albeit with gradual returns, the alternative route circumnavigating Africa around the Cape of Good Hope. This, of course, involves extended travel times of 10-15 days and has a significant impact on maritime freight rates.

Data for September and the third quarter of 2026 confirm that the Suez Canal is not "closed" and remains fully operational from an infrastructural point of view, showing encouraging signs of recovery. However, the return to flooding normality will depend entirely on stability of security in the Red Sea and in the Bab el-Mandeb region.