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Libro Bianco sulla sicurezza del trasporto containerizzato
E' stato pubblicato dal World Shipping Council, dall'International Mass Retail Association e dalla National Industrial Transportation League
15 settembre 2003
Il World Shipping Council, l'International Mass Retail Association e la National Industrial Transportation League hanno stilato un Libro Bianco - riportato di seguito - nel quale sono avanzate una serie di proposte per incrementare la sicurezza del traffico containerizzato e per limitare i rischi che i container siano manomessi durante le operazioni di trasporto.

 

World Shipping Council

IMRA
International Mass Retail Association

The National Industrial Transportation League

 

In-Transit Container Security Enhancement

September 9, 2003

______________________

Since September 11, 2001, governments and industry have given extensive consideration to the issue of protecting international commerce from terrorist threats. One of the maritime security issues that has been given particular attention is the security of containerized cargo shipments.

The World Shipping Council (Council), the International Mass Retail Association (IMRA), the National Industrial Transportation League (League), and their member companies (hereinafter "the industry") have supported the U.S. government's efforts to establish the "24 hour rule" by which carriers file advance shipment information with the U.S. government 24 hours before loading containerized cargo aboard a ship bound for the U.S., so that the government can conduct a risk-based screening of all such shipments. The industry supports the Container Security Initiative (CSI) establishing government-to-government agreements addressing data sharing, risk assessment, and cargo screening and, where appropriate, inspection. The industry supports the deployment by governments of more non-intrusive container inspection equipment both here and at foreign loading ports so that any shipment of containerized cargo that warrants inspection can be inspected efficiently and quickly. The industry supports the Customs' Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program establishing a government-industry partnership designed to enhance the security of the entire shipment supply chain. The industry continues to support the development and implementation of analogous efforts at the international level through the World Customs Organization. The industry has supported the Coast Guard's vessel and port security initiatives internationally and in domestic rulemakings. The industry supported the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.1 The industry strongly supports the governments of trading nations establishing predictable and transparent, and mutually consistent, security rules governing these issues.

Two of the most important responsibilities regarding container security are the secure loading (or "stuffing") and sealing of a container by the shipper, and the in-transit security of the container once a carrier picks up the loaded, sealed container from the shipper's premises until the container is delivered to its destination.

The first feature ' the secure stuffing of the container ' is where container security begins. Without it, in-transit security is obviously of limited value. Carriers do not load the cargo into or seal a container. The shipper performs those functions.

Container security is thus a shared responsibility. The shipper is responsible for stuffing and sealing a safe and secure container. Those who have custody of the container during its transit are responsible for its security in transit. Government also has critical responsibilities, and, with the support of carriers and shippers, it has expanded its capabilities to gather and analyze advance data on all container shipments, screen all such shipments, and inspect any container that raises a security question.

1 Ocean carriers and shippers have supported the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection's ("CBP") development of the 24-hour advance cargo filing rules, the Container Security Initiative, and the C-TPAT program. The industry understands that CBP has responsibility for containerized cargo security within DHS, but also understands that the Transportation Security Administration within DHS has been delegated authority under several sections of the Maritime Transportation Security Act that address containerized cargo security issues. Clarity on the respective roles and responsibilities of TSA and CBP in this regard is needed. This paper assumes that the programs, operating systems, regulations and personnel of CBP would be whom the industry would interface with in implementing these recommendations, but the industry would obviously accommodate a defined TSA role as well.

This paper, while recognizing the essential security importance of the container stuffing process and the government cargo screening and inspection processes, does not address those issues. This paper only addresses the issues involved in the following proposed set of protocols and requirements for enhancing the in-transit security of containerized cargo shipments.

In doing so, it should be stressed that the security of container stuffing, the government's risk assessment and cargo screening systems, procedures and capabilities, and the enhanced deployment and use of non-intrusive container inspection equipment are critically important. In-transit security, while important, is not a substitute for these.

This paper submits that the issue of "in-transit" security can best be explored both by considering what can be done in the short term to enhance the in-transit security of loaded containers being shipped to the United States2, and what might be a security objective for a future "smart" container. By "short term", we mean hopefully within a year. By "future", we mean within several years, not a vision that may be decades away. The Council, IMRA, and the League offer these views in the hope that they will be useful to the efforts to enhance the security of international commerce and the security of all trading nations' economies.



2 This proposed regime would not apply to empty containers. Pursuant to the C-TPAT program, to which all the Council's member companies and many members of IMRA and the League belong, ocean carriers have agreed to inspect all empty containers prior to loading them aboard a vessel, but carriers do not support the application of a requirement to seal empty containers. In fact, carrier security representatives have expressed concern that a blanket requirement to seal empties could create security issues because they could not be easily opened and checked.

In addition, the regime proposed in this document could apply to U.S. export containers. The United States' trading partners could understandably expect the U.S. to apply the same security measures to its export cargo that is applied to its import cargo. We also recognize, however, that there may be issues that could cause some to want to address export shipments separately. In that regard, for example, (1) we are unclear of the capabilities of the Automated Export System (AES) to handle the seal reporting data recommended herein, (2) American exporters would probably need some time to comply because they are less consistent in applying seals to containers than shippers of import containers, particularly shippers of low value export commodities such as waste paper, hay, etc., and (3) a broader seal and "in-transit" security regime may logically need to be developed to apply to all cargo shipments, domestic and export, being transported in containers and in highway trailers within the United States, and not just to containers that are being transported with export cargo.


 

 

A. Proposed Short Term Vision

Based on the foregoing, the Council, IMRA, and the League propose for consideration the following updated amplification of the Council's position as set forth in its January 2002 White Paper as a definition of short term requirements that the government should establish for all shippers and carriers:



1. Shipper Obligation To Seal: A shipper3 is responsible for sealing, and should be required by law to seal, a container upon stuffing it. The shipper must provide the seal number on all shipping documents.

2. Seal Standards: All seals must meet a minimum standard. We recommend the ISO standard for high security seals (PAS 17712). We recommend that the government establish a specific date by which all containerized shipments must be affixed with such seals by the shipper. If the shipper chooses, it may use a seal that goes above the minimum standard.

3. Recording Seal Changes: When persons having custody of a container, including U.S., state and local government officials, break the seal for legitimate reasons, they must be required to affix a new seal meeting the ISO standard, and provide the carrier or terminal operator in possession of the container with a written confirmation of the event. The carrier must record the new seal number on the shipping documents.


3 The term "shipper" in this context is meant to refer to the party responsible for the safe and secure loading or "stuffing" of the container. That party may or may not be the party with whom the carrier has the transportation contract

4 "Modal interchange" here would cover the modal transfer of the container from ocean carrier to trucker, trucker to rail, rail to truck, etc, but is not intended to cover rail interline changes where, for example, control of a stacktrain is transferred from one railroad to another railroad.

Recognizing that a U.S. regulation cannot be effectively imposed on persons not subject to U.S. jurisdiction, this requirement should nevertheless apply to all persons within the U.S. and otherwise subject to U.S. jurisdiction. We would support this same set of requirements being applied outside U.S. jurisdiction by other governments so that a common international approach to this issue can be established, and recommend that CBP work to incorporate them in the various CSI agreements with other governments.

4. Modal Changes: The party receiving the container (e.g., trucker, railroad) at each modal interchange4 must verify and record the seal, its number and its condition upon receipt of the container. If there is a seal discrepancy or anomaly, the receiving party shall inform the shipper, the party tendering the container, and the party to whom it delivers the container of such discrepancy or anomaly, and shall note the anomaly or seal discrepancy on the shipping documents.

5. Ocean Carrier Seal Verification: The ocean carrier or its agent must verify the seal, meaning that the ocean carrier should determine before loading a container onto a vessel bound for the U.S.:

  1. Whether a proper ISO standard seal is affixed to the container,
  2. In the affirmative, whether the seal is intact,
  3. What the seal number is, and
  4. Whether that seal number is the same as the shipper has stated in the shipping documents it originally affixed to the container.5


  5. 5 There will be some situations where the carrier may not be able to verify the match of the seal numbers until after the vessel is loaded. For example, the seal number provided by the shipper may be duly recorded in the shipping documents and provided to CBP via the AMS system 24 hours before vessel loading. An hour before vessel loading, the container arrives through the marine terminal gate, the seal number is read and entered into the terminal operator's system. The transfer of the data from the marine terminal operator to the carrier and the cross-referencing of the seal number in the carrier's system may not be completed until after vessel loading has completed. In that situation, the carrier could promptly report the fact and any explanation it receives to CBP via the AMS system, so that, if there is an inadequate explanation of the discrepancy by the time the ship arrives, CBP can inspect the container at the U.S. port of discharge.

    6 These procedures could be included in the vessel carrier's C-TPAT security plan.

    7 See additional discussion of electronic seals in Part B.

    This verification may occur at the marine terminal gate or after entry to the terminal but before vessel loading. If the marine terminal at which the vessel loading occurs does not have a terminal security plan that conforms to the ISPS Code or is determined by the U.S. or foreign government to be not adequately secure, then CBP, in consultation and coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard which has regulatory responsibilities for foreign port assessments, should include that factor in its Automated Targeting System (ATS) to determine the appropriate treatment of the container.

    For U.S. bound containers that arrive at a foreign marine terminal via on-dock rail rather than through the terminal gate, the carrier or its agent should be required to conduct a seal verification of such containers in the terminal before vessel loading.

    For U.S. bound containers that are relayed from a vessel or barge at a foreign marine terminal, the carrier or its agent should be required to have the seals verified in the terminal before vessel loading, unless the carrier has verifiable procedures in place to ensure that the container seal was previously checked at the marine terminal where the container was originally loaded onto the relay vessel or barge.6

    The carrier should have a compliance program to ensure that the seal verifications are performed.

    If the above can be verified through manual procedures, that should be acceptable. If the above can be verified in the future through electronic means, that should be acceptable. The industry must have the flexibility to decide when it is most appropriate to use e-seal technology to accomplish these checks.7



8 Item 1 recommends that a shipper be required to seal the container upon stuffing it. Recognizing that there are limits to the government's jurisdiction to regulate conduct in other countries, we nevertheless believe that it is important for CBP to establish significant consequences for cargo interests if they do not fulfill their security obligation and apply a proper seal upon stuffing the container. If the carrier addresses the problem of non-standard seals by putting an ISO standard seal on the container, and there are no consequences to the shipper or the consignee, then inadequate compliance will result.

9 It is important to recognize that there are seal changes on hundreds of thousands of container cargo shipments in U.S. commerce each year, and the vast majority of them do not give rise to security concerns. In some countries, local Customs officials will break the seal on every export container and affix a new seal. Seals are security indicators; however, just as an intact seal does not guarantee that a shipment hasn't been tampered with, a changed seal does not necessarily mean that there is a security problem with a container. The industry nevertheless believes that there would be security value in governments establishing uniform, consistent, seal protocol requirements as recommended herein.

10 The industry considered recommending that any seal discrepancy be provided to CBP pursuant to the 24-hour rule and carriers be allowed to load unless CBP said not to, but that could require all containers to be received in the marine terminal considerably earlier than 24 hours before loading and probably roughly 48 hours before vessel loading. This would present serious operational limitations and delays to commerce. The industry also considered holding all containers with seal anomalies until CBP provided an affirmative OK to load, but believe from experience, from the numbers of seal anomalies that do occur without security implications, and from CBP's responses pursuant to 24 hour rule questions, that this would overwhelm CBP and delay commerce unnecessarily. CBP retains the ability to inspect a container with a seal anomaly at the U.S. port of discharge.


6. Requirement of Seal to Load Aboard the Vessel: The government should establish a requirement that no loaded container be stowed aboard a vessel without an intact, conforming seal.

7. Addressing Seal Anomalies: If a carrier receives a loaded container with a seal that does not meet the ISO standard referenced above, the carrier shall leave the nonconforming seal in place, and shall apply an ISO standard seal. The carrier shall record the new seal number on the bill of lading, and inform CBP of the fact in its AMS filing. CBP should consider such information in its ATS profiling of container shipments.8

If during or after seal verification, the carrier finds a seal discrepancy or a broken or missing seal, the carrier shall attempt to obtain an explanation of the anomaly.9 In the event of a seal anomaly, the carrier shall notify CBP of the anomaly and the explanation it has received via AMS. Such notification shall not start a new 24-hour clock. CBP is requested to program the AMS data field for seal information to accommodate written textual explanations in order to accomplish this. CPB may order the inspection of any container that has had a seal anomaly at CSI loading ports or at the U.S. port of discharge.10

Implementation of Proposed Short Term Vision

We propose a consultative, government-industry planning process for the development of an implementation schedule for these proposed requirements, which should address, inter alia:

  • The most appropriate authority under which the government should promulgate the requirements proposed in Items 1-7 above11,
  • The schedule for CBP's information systems to be reprogrammed to accept the additional seal data proposed,
  • An implementation schedule for port and marine terminal operators who would need to change their processes or technologies to accomplish the above,
  • The international review and adoption of such requirements through a predictable, transparent, and mutually consistent approach.


 


11 See footnote 1.

12 It is important to recognize that e-seals are not necessarily a solution to containerized cargo security concerns. As a report by the Vulnerability Assessment Team at the Los Alamos National Laboratory states: "High-tech electronic seals are not automatically better than simple mechanical seals, and are often worse." "Tamper-Indicating Seals: Practices, Problems and Standards", by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., Vulnerability Assessment Team. Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico. Prepared for the World Customs Organization Task Force on Security and Trade Facilitation February 2003 Meeting, page 1.


 

B. Electronic Seals

Electronic seals have not been proven to provide any greater security than mechanical seals.12 It is highly unlikely that an electronic seal product meeting technical, operational, standard-setting and economic criteria can be developed, agreed upon and implemented within the twelve month goal of the proposed short term vision discussed above. Carriers and shippers, however, may want to consider the option of using e-seals to implement the above. In considering that possibility, and because of the interest in the issue of e-seals, the industry's members have considered that an e-seal should possess the following security characteristics:

  1. Have a unique seal number that can be BOTH electronically read and can be read visually, as it is wholly impractical to have electronic readers at all relevant points;
  2. Record the date and time when the seal was activated or sealed;
  3. Record the date and time when the seal was opened or breached;


  4. 13 Discussions at the ISO to establish an e-seal standard have not been successful, in part because e-seal manufacturers cannot agree on a single radio frequency (RF). The operational and logistical difficulties of having to try to work with multiple different radio frequencies at the same time, however, are substantial.

    First, whatever RF bandwidth is chosen, it is essential that the bandwidth be publicly available in all trading nations. If the bandwidth is available in the U.S., but not, for example, in China, the electronic device's purpose would be thwarted.

    Second, a fundamental characteristic of the liner industry's operations is the efficient movement of containers through many different facilities and many different national jurisdictions in many different ways. In order to be able to read e-seals on containers in a multiple radio-frequency-environment, the carriers and numerous land-based facilities around the world would have to install different types of readers. Alternatively, the industry would have to invest in multi-frequency seals and readers. Neither of these options would be operationally attractive, cost-effective or in conformity with what should be the objective of any standard setting process -- the development of a common standard and the avoidance of incompatible solutions.

    Furthermore, a standard must ensure e-seal interoperability amongst all trading nations. Multiple bandwidths may accommodate the desires of various seal vendors that want to use those varying parts of the spectrum for their particular products, but it does not ensure international interoperability. For example, assume that Nation A elects one bandwidth for this use but not others. What effect would that have on operations and the government's treatment of containers, affixed with seals using the other bandwidths, being shipped to or from Nation A?

    14 Even if all e-seals were to operate at the same frequency, there is still a concern that e-seals are being designed by manufacturers to require proprietary readers. Marine terminals need to be able to use a universal reader capable of interrogating different seals manufactured by various manufacturers.

  5. If an RF device, operate within a single radio frequency bandwidth approved and publicly available in all trading nations;13
  6. Must be able to be read by a universal reader capable of interrogating seals from different manufacturers;14
  7. Must perform reliably in all operating environments with an insignificant number of false readings; and
  8. Meet the minimum physical security standards of the ISO high security seal standard.

The container number does not need to be recorded in the device because that will be captured in the shipping documents, and the shipping documents will need to be cross-referenced anyhow by the carrier to ensure that the seal number provided by the shipper for inclusion in the bill of lading is the seal number on the container.

Because its security purpose is to provide evidence regarding whether the seal has been opened or tampered with in transit, an e-seal would only need a "read" capability, not a "read and write" capability. Adding a "write" capability to e-seals could create, rather than reduce, security vulnerabilities, e.g., security credentialing of all persons with "write" capability, the impossibility of monitoring whether unauthorized persons obtained the "write" capability, and potential manipulation or alteration of the data already entered into the device, as well as other cyber-security related vulnerabilities.

The commercial availability of such devices and their readers, at reasonable and competitive prices, will be a significant factor to carriers, shippers, and terminal operators in their decision regarding whether to use manual or electronic seals as an indicator of in-transit tampering.



 

 

C. Future "Smart Container" Vision

A shipping container is a sturdy steel box. It is not "smart". A security-marketing vernacular has arisen suggesting that certain technologies might be available that could enhance security, and that this would create a "smart" container of the future. It would be a serious security error simply to assume that technology can be applied to shipping containers and "solve" the problem of container security. It would also be a mistake to think that such a concept can replace enhanced screening and inspection of containers or more secure operating procedures, especially those involving the stuffing of the container.

As unfortunate and misleading as the term "smart" container may be, it would also be a mistake not to assess what technology may be appropriate for containers that would reduce their in-transit security vulnerability and enhance security. The following observations should be relevant to this examination.

1. Some of what can make a container more secure (and presumably "smarter") does not involve high technology.

Container seals have traditionally been applied to the container door handle or door hasp. As drug traffickers have demonstrated, this location for the seal has vulnerabilities, and seal location can be improved. There are a variety of ways this can be addressed, including cable seals, and different locations for the seal. The industry is committed to continue to work with the government to address this vulnerability.

Container doors can often be removed from the outside of the container, leaving the seal intact. The possibility of modifying the design of future containers that will be built to eliminate this risk should, as a matter of priority, be pursued in accordance with the provisions and procedures of the 1972 IMO Convention for Safe Containers, and possibly also the 1972 Customs Convention on Containers.15 The United States is a signatory to both conventions. Efforts are underway at the ISO to ensure that the necessary standardization measures can be taken to accommodate future design modifications.16



15 The 1972 Customs Convention on Containers provides for the incorporation of such design features for containers moving under Customs seals. Those provisions have hitherto not been utilized. The governing body of the Convention will meet in late October to discuss, inter alia, the possibility of activating those provisions. In such an event, the ISO could be expected to be called upon to develop specific standards for new design features.

16 The ISO has traditionally played a supporting role for the IMO Convention and changes to it. Thus it is appropriate that the ISO prepare itself for future design decisions of the IMO and their practical implementation.

The required application of a high security seal by the shipper upon stuffing the container will make it more secure, and this should be required as a matter of law ' preferably by a mandatory, international instrument.

2. Some of what is promoted to make a container "smart" has no security foundation, and in fact could create security problems.

For example, an electronic tag can be affixed to the exterior of the container and contain the shipper's description of the cargo. While some vendors have stated that this is a way to enhance security by telling someone with a reader what is in the box, this is not correct. First, such a tag only provides the information that the party filling out the cargo declaration records in the device. Secondly, this could increase security risks of theft, as anyone with a functioning reader could know the contents. There are also unsolved cyber-security issues, including the risk of manipulating the stored information to disguise the true nature of the contents. Third, the carrier and CBP already have the shipper's cargo description in the carrier's cargo manifest, and CBP already performs its security screening based on this manifest information which is provided by the carrier to the government 24 hours before the container is loaded aboard a vessel.

For example, some parties describe "smart" electronic devices as having both the ability to be electronically "read" for certain security information (such as whether the seal is the same seal that was applied by the shipper upon stuffing the box and whether it is intact), and having the ability for people to "write" information into the device. We do not see "write" technology as a security need or enhancement, and in fact, believe it can create significant security vulnerabilities and complexities.17



17 See Part B above.

3. A security technology and security function of very high importance is non-intrusive container inspection equipment, which is not part of the container.

We strongly believe that CBP's container risk assessment programs and their implementation (via inspection of any container that does not meet risk analysis criteria) should be enhanced so that any questions about a container's contents are addressed by non-intrusive inspection of the container, preferably at the port of loading pursuant to bilateral or regional CSI-like agreements rather than at the port of discharge. We believe that continued enhancement of non-intrusive container inspection equipment availability and technology is critically important, as it answers the question of most importance and relevance, namely:

"What is in the box?" No container can be "smart" enough to answer that question.

This is an important point that should be emphasized. Non-intrusive container inspection equipment is necessary as a preventative mechanism to enhance security, and just as importantly, it is likely to be one of the most important tools available to confidently keep international trade flowing in the event of a terrorist crisis. That is one of the reasons the CSI program is so important to international trade, and why all CSI countries need to have sufficient non-intrusive container inspection equipment to address both prevention and response scenario needs. While the U.S. government is considerably expanding its equipment availability in this regard, it is just as important that such equipment also be properly deployed in adequate quantities at foreign ports of loading.

4. Technology to detect radiation or various different kinds of chemicals or substances emanating from particular kinds of cargo in a container should be deployed by government inspectors at ports, not applied to approximately eleven million containers in circulation around the world, which pass through the possession of numerous parties who would have the opportunity to tamper with or disable the detector or sensor.

There are many questions regarding the concept of requiring containers to be equipped with various possible sensors, rather than having such sensors used by government law enforcement officials inspecting containers.



First, it is unclear what specifically would need to be "sensed"; the list of potential substances or characteristics is long, varied, not agreed and imprecise. Second, it is very unclear what the operational reliability of such sensors would be when deployed on containers that travel considerable distances, through many operating conditions, and for long periods of time without servicing internal electronic devices. Third, the government is already working on and deploying inspection sensors and detectors for nuclear, radiological, drugs and other substance sensing that can be more effectively and efficiently deployed via inspection of the container at the port rather than via attaching multiple electronic sensor components to eleven million containers. Fourth, a future vision in this context should be one that could realistically be years away, not decades. Even if the devices were available to be installed in or on containers at reasonable cost, did not provide false positives, were maintenance free, were reliable, and were tamper-proof, it would be far more efficient and reliable for the government to operate and deploy them at inspection points and ports. That capability could be deployed relatively quickly and efficiently in contrast to the enormous difficulty in trying to retrofit such devices onto more than eleven million containers that are located all around the globe. Fifth, even if such sensors could be applied to containers, there are types of containers on which they would be completely ineffective, such as open tops and flat racks. Port based sensors and non-intrusive inspection equipment is the only way to effectively address security concerns about these kinds of shipments. Finally, outfitting millions of containers with one or more electronic devices would raise very substantial information system issues, which are discussed under Item 6 below.

5. Some technology features discussed as part of a "smart" container are not practical security features.

For example, some have suggested every container should be electronically programmed with a trip plan for each shipment, with a requirement or expectation that any shipment that deviates from the trip plan be identified and subjected to security scrutiny. This would raise a host of issues, including subjective determinations of reasonable deviations and a plethora of false security alerts that would destroy the credibility of the device.

For example, some have suggested "smart" containers or "smart" container equipment be electronically tied to the security credentialing of each person who seals and loads a container. Personnel credentialing may be appropriate for a shipper as part of C-TPAT or similar risk assessment programs, but not as part of a container. It would create far too many complexities. Furthermore, the electronic device on the container would also be easily fooled or defeated by an even moderately sophisticated conspiracy.

6. There are, however, container security attributes which technology may be able to address more effectively and which the industry would like to consider in concert with the government.

A. Intrusion: The first attribute that falls into this category is the detection of container intrusion.

First, it is important to obtain agreement on this term's definition. For example, we believe the term "intrusion" means intrusion into the container from any exterior location, i.e., floor, walls, roof, doors. Seals and e-seals detect tampering with a seal, but not container intrusion -- despite some manufacturers' marketing claims. Some other devices may be able to detect if the container doors have been opened, but not if the container was entered through the roof. Agreement on the definition is thus quite important.

Second, such technology must be reliable, must be low maintenance, must provide an insignificant number of false alarms, and must be reasonably priced. The technology must not be something that can be disabled. This technology would need to be fully and satisfactorily tested in a commercial operating environment that involves the government, carriers, shippers and other parties with possession of the containers.

Third, consideration must be given to what kind of technology can meet a requirement to detect intrusion. Must it be electronic? If it is, how will its information be communicated? Through readers at specific locations?

Fourth, there are very complicated information and accountability questions that must be addressed in considering this issue. Whose information system obtains the information? Who acts on the information? How does one screen the many benign intrusions (e.g., door opening by a Customs inspector) from non-benign intrusions, and who would do the screening, evaluation and action assessment? Consider an example -- an ocean carrier may move a container on a port-to-port bill of lading, completing its service at the port of discharge. Assume that a trucker at the shipper's direction then picks up the container at the port and transports the container under its own, separate bill of lading, and during that service by the trucker, there is an intrusion. Who is alerted? Who determines if there is a security issue? Who resolves it? Consider another example ' a carrier agrees with a third party transportation broker to reposition its empty container from the East Coast to a West Coast port. Assume the broker uses the container for the movement of cargo for one of its customers to the West Coast, as frequently occurs, and during that movement, there is an intrusion. Same questions as above.

It is also very important to understand that an ocean carrier does not have physical custody of its containers most of the time. We estimate that, on average, ocean carriers have custody of their containers roughly 25 to 33 percent of the time. This number can be more and can be less depending on the geographic trade lane that the equipment may be in at the time, or the equipment operating practices of the carrier. The rest of the time, the container will not be aboard a vessel or in a port but may be in the possession of a number of different parties, such as a railroad, a trucker, a barge company, a consolidator, a warehouse, a shipper, a shipper's supplier, or a consignee. Furthermore, containers may be interchanged between or among different shipping lines, meaning Line A's container could be full of cargo being transported by Line B. Furthermore, containers do not operate in dedicated service to and from the U.S., but are elements of global container fleets and used to move cargo globally. A container that moves goods in U.S. foreign commerce today may not ever come back to the U.S.

Accordingly, intrusion technology would require the above issues to be considered and addressed, including the information and accountability issues when the ocean carrier does not have possession of the container. And, technology permanently affixed to a container would not be practical if it were only for U.S. commerce and did not meet internationally agreed standards.

In sum, the industry believes that container intrusion detection may be an appropriate objective to explore, but it will require considerable analysis in order to address legitimate and complicated issues.

B. Location: The second security attribute that may fall into this category is container location. The security interest involved is to be able to quickly locate a container that may be identified as containing a potential security risk.

Carriers already have significant container location capability. If the container is on a vessel, the carrier will know the vessel's position and the position of the container on the vessel. If the container is at a marine terminal, the carrier can contact the marine terminal directly or through the terminal operator's information system to determine the location of the container in the yard. If the container is on a train, the rail carrier will know the location of the train and the location of the container on the train. If the container is with a trucker, the ocean carrier will know who the trucker is. Some trucks have GPS capability in North America, but not all.

It is true that this container location capability relies on databases and their accessibility, rather than real time location capability. But this only illustrates that container location, or, more precisely, the ability to locate a container within a relatively short, defined time frame requires a careful and specific discussion of what this requirement would be. The technology involved could vary substantially depending on the definition of the requirement. For example, how precise a location would be required? Does this envision the capability to locate a container only in the U.S.? On a ship, stowed below deck? On a ship anywhere in the world? In container stacks in a terminal, aboard a barge, a double-stack train, etc? Anywhere in the world? Also, discussion and agreement would be needed on the issue of how quickly the container would need to be located. The technology, its cost, and its practicality could vary significantly depending on the definition of the requirement.

Also, if this objective were to be addressed through an electronic device, the issues identified in Item 6A. regarding information systems and accountability issues would have to be addressed. In addition, any such device would have to be incapable of being disabled if it is to accomplish its presumed security purpose.



 

 

D. Conclusion

Enhancing the security of international commerce is a shared responsibility of shippers, transport providers, ports and marine terminals, and governments. The clear definition of parties' roles and responsibilities, backed by uniformly applied government regulatory requirements, is essential.

This paper offers a proposed set of concepts and requirements from the liner shipping industry and shippers to address in-transit container security. The industry recognizes that in-transit container security, while not the principal security vulnerability of such commerce, should be governed by predictable, transparent and consistent rules addressing the issue.

Part A of the paper offers a proposed vision for specific, actionable measures to enhance the in-transit security of containers. The paper proposes that these measures be implemented as government requirements. Why is the industry asking for government requirements to do this? There are a number of reasons. First, these security measures both are expensive and will at times inconvenience commerce. If one company inconveniences its customers or must incur substantial costs, but the competition is not doing the same thing, the security measures are unlikely to be effectively implemented and compliance will be inadequate. All parties must be required to play by the same rules and be on a level playing field. Second, if the measure provides a valid enhancement of security, everyone should be required to do it. Third, the industry wants to be sure that the proposed measures meet, conform with, and reflect the government's requirements and objectives on this issue.

Part B of the paper offers ocean carriers' and shippers' views on the potential use, value and features of electronic seals. There is still considerable uncertainty about the capabilities, operability, reliability and costs of such devices, as is discussed in the paper. Electronic seals are not capable of being adopted in a commercial context in the short run; however, members of the industry want the ability to consider whether they can meet seal checking requirements more efficiently and effectively by electing to use such technology. For that reason, the industry has identified what it believes are the necessary and appropriate security requirements of an electronic seal. The development and deployment of e-seals will only be delayed by product vendors trying to add features to the devices that are not necessary for meeting security objectives, and by the failure to adopt a single, universally available radio frequency bandwidth. The industry hopes that an articulation of what the devices' security requirements should be will help focus and progress the discussion of this issue.

Part C of the paper offers industry comments on how future technology may be applied to enhance the security of international commerce, and when such technology would be most effectively applied at inspection points rather than affixed to eleven million instrumentalities of international commerce. In this part, the industry stresses the priority need for the improvement and expanded deployment of non-intrusive container inspection equipment. The CSI infrastructure being constructed to enhance security requires a clear focus on making sure that this technology is properly deployed and used, not only at U.S. ports of discharge, but at ports of loading around the world.



The Council, IMRA, the League and their member companies remain committed to continued close cooperation with the government on the wide range of security initiatives ' including vessel security, port facility security, personnel security, container stuffing security, and container screening and inspection. The Council, IMRA, and the League hope that this paper is a constructive contribution to that effort, and are willing to present and discuss these issues in greater detail to all relevant government agencies, including how these issues can also be addressed and pursued at the international level.

*******

The World Shipping Council, a non-profit association of over forty international ocean carriers, was established to address public policy issues of interest and importance to the international liner shipping industry. The Council's members include the full spectrum of ocean common carriers, from large global operators to trade-specific niche carriers, offering container, roll-on roll-off, car carrier and other international transportation services. They carry more than 93% of the United States' imports and exports transported by the international liner shipping industry, or roughly $500 billion worth of American foreign commerce per year.

The International Mass Retail Association is the world's leading alliance of retailers and their product and service suppliers. IMRA members represent over $1 trillion in sales annually and operate over 100,000 stores, manufacturing facilities, and distribution centers nationwide. Our member retailers and suppliers have facilities in all 50 states, as well as internationally, and employ millions of Americans. As a full-service trade association, IMRA provides industry research and education, government advocacy, and a unique forum for its members to establish relationships, solve problems, and work together for the benefit of the consumer and the mass retail industry.

The National Industrial Transportation League is an organization of shippers that conduct industrial and/or commercial enterprises throughout the United States and internationally. The League, founded in 1907, is the oldest and largest U.S. organization representing shippers of all sizes and all commodities. The League has approximately 600 separate company members. These include some of the largest commercial and industrial enterprises in the United States, many with operations throughout the world, as well as numerous smaller shippers. League members ship substantial volumes of commodities worldwide in all major international trades via ocean carriage.

›››Archivio notizie
DALLA PRIMA PAGINA
Si aggrava il bilancio dell'esplosione nel porto iraniano di Shahid Rajaee
Teheran
Ha causato 46 morti e il ferimento oltre 1.200 persone
CEVA Logistics (gruppo CMA CGM) comprerà la turca Borusan Lojistik
Istanbul/Marsiglia
Transazione del valore di 440 milioni di dollari
Positivo il primo trimestre di Wärtsilä
Helsinki
Battuta d'arresto della crescita del valore dei nuovi ordini
ESPO, bene la richiesta della Commissione Bilancio del Parlamento UE di maggiori finanziamenti per i trasporti, l'energia e le infrastrutture
Bruxelles
Evidenziata l'importanza del finanziamento delle reti TEN-T per consentirne l'adattamento a fini di duplice uso sia militare che civile
Contributo di solidarietà per le famiglie di lavoratori portuali vittime di incidenti sul lavoro
Roma
È stato istituito dall'Ente Bilaterale Nazionale Porti
La divisione Marine & Offshore di Bureau Veritas registra un fatturato trimestrale record
Neuilly-sur-Seine
Nuovo picco storico anche della flotta classificata
PSA starebbe valutando di cedere la propria partecipazione del 20% in Hutchison Ports
Singapore
Lo afferma la “Reuters”, che a fine 2022 aveva già ventilato questa ipotesi
Federagenti, l'Italia imprima una brusca accelerazione ai progetti di ZES, zone franche e Zone logistiche speciali
Roma
Pessina: non esistono spazi per riflessioni prede della burocrazia
Nel primo trimestre di quest'anno il traffico delle merci nel porto di Rotterdam è diminuito del -5,8%
Rotterdam
In calo sia i carichi allo sbarco (-3,1%) che quelli all'imbarco (-11,9%)
L'aumento dei carichi in container non basta al porto di Anversa-Bruges per evitare un calo del -4,0% del traffico trimestrale
Anversa
Si è accentuata la flessione delle rinfuse liquide (-19,1%)
La China Shipowners' Association considera le misure adottate dagli USA contro le navi cinesi un tipico esempio di unilateralismo e protezionismo
Pechino/Washington
Il WSC ribadisce che tali misure potrebbero minare il commercio americano, danneggiare i produttori statunitensi e indebolire gli sforzi per rafforzare l'industria marittima nazionale
COSCO manifesta ferma opposizione alle tasse sulle navi cinesi programmate dagli USA
Cresce la quota dei nuovi entranti nel settore del trasporto ferroviario europeo
Madrid
Nel 2023 le performance del trasporto merci su rotaia sono diminuite del -8%
Le nuove tasse sulle navi cinesi che non faranno altro che aumentare i prezzi per gli americani
Washington
Lo ha denunciato il vice presidente esecutivo dell'U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Definiti gli importi delle tasse a carico di navi collegate alla Cina in arrivo nei porti USA
Washington
Calcolati in base alla portata netta o al volume di container, saranno applicati da ottobre e verranno progressivamente aumentati
Avviata la gara internazionale assegnare in concessione il nuovo cantiere navale del porto di Casablanca
Casablanca
È il più grande dell'Africa e dal 2019 è inutilizzato
Federlogistica, l'industria deve smettere di approcciarsi alla logistica solo in termini di costi
Genova
Falteri: necessaria una cabina di regia nazionale composta da rappresentanti del settore logistico e dei gruppi industriali
ABB chiude un primo trimestre positivo anche se la crescita del fatturato è inferiore alle attese
Zurigo
Wierod: il nostro consolidato approccio local-for-local ci mette al riparo dalla guerra dei dazi
Nuovo accordo per il salario minimo globale per i marittimi
Ginevra
Il livello salirà a 690 dollari dal primo gennaio 2026 per raggiungere i 704 dal 2027 e i 715 dollari dal 2028
Quest'anno gli scambi mondiali di merci potrebbero calare del -1,5%
Ginevra
Lo prevede la WTO. Okonjo-Iweala: la persistente incertezza minaccia di frenare la crescita globale, con gravi conseguenze negative per il mondo
Nel 2023 circa due terzi di tutte le merci movimentate nell'UE sono state trasportate via mare
Lussemburgo
Nel periodo 2013-2023 è cresciuta solo la quota del trasporto su strada, mentre è diminuita quella delle altre modalità
Sospese le spedizioni postali di merci da Hong Kong agli USA
Hong Kong
Hongkong Post prospetta tariffe esorbitanti e irragionevoli a causa delle azioni ingiustificate e intimidatorie degli Stati Uniti
Confitarma evidenzia la necessità che la strategia di decarbonizzazione non penalizzi lo shipping rispetto ad altre modalità
Roma
Zanetti: garantire inoltre che il processo di implementazione tenga conto delle esigenze operative dell'industria
Intercargo e Intertanko manifestano preoccupazioni sull'accordo per la decarbonizzazione dello shipping
Londra
Evidenziata la complessità della misura adottata dall'IMO e l'inusuale procedura da cui sono state escluse le organizzazioni non governative
Nel primo trimestre del 2025 impennata degli attacchi dei pirati alle navi
Nel primo trimestre del 2025 impennata degli attacchi dei pirati alle navi
Londra
Accentuata crescita degli incidenti negli Stretti di Singapore
Interferry accoglie positivamente l'accordo IMO sulla decarbonizzazione dello shipping, ma ritiene la strategia troppo complessa
Victoria/Pireo
L'associazione degli armatori greci delusa per il mancato riconoscimento del ruolo essenziale dei combustibili di transizione come il GNL
L'International Labour Organization riconosce i marittimi come lavoratori chiave
Londra
ITF e ICS: momento storico
CMA CGM acquisirà il 35% dell'egiziana October Dry Port
Il Cairo
La società gestisce un porto secco nella zona industriale e logistica nei pressi del Cairo
Alla TiL del gruppo MSC l'intero controllo dei terminal di Hutchison Ports
New York
Lo scrive “Bloomberg”, specificando che i terminal panamensi sarebbero gestiti congiuntamente con BlackRock
La bozza di regolamento sulla decarbonizzazione dello shipping approvata dal MEPC include uno standard obbligatorio per il fuel e una tariffazione delle emissioni di gas serra
Londra/Washington/Bruxelles
Prevista l'istituzione di un Fondo per raccogliere le risorse derivanti dalla prezzatura delle emissioni
Task force di cinque associazioni per il rilancio del cargo ferroviario italiano
Roma
Iniziativa di Agens, Assoferr, Assologistica, Fercargo e Fermerci
Il MIT indica Matteo Paroli quale nuovo presidente dei porti di Genova e Savona-Vado
Roma/La Spezia
La community portuale spezzina sollecita un nome anche per l'AdSP della Liguria orientale
Le Aziende informano
Il retrofit ibrido-elettrico di ABB guida i traghetti dei laghi italiani verso un futuro più sostenibile
Confitarma sottolinea l'importanza che la strategia di decarbonizzazione dello shipping sia definita in sede IMO
Roma
La Confederazione italiana precisa di condividere alcune preoccupazioni degli USA
Il WSC ribadisce che le misure di Trump per l'industria marittima nazionale non fanno bene all'economia americana
Washington
Kramek: pronti a supportare l'amministrazione con proposte costruttive
Fincantieri e Accenture istituiscono la joint venture Fincantieri Ingenium
Trieste/Milano
L'obiettivo è di guidare la trasformazione digitale del prodotto nave e della logistica portuale
Meyer Werft ha consegnato la nuova nave da crociera di lusso Asuka III alla NYK Cruises
Papenburg/Emden
Ha una capacità di 744 passeggeri e 470 membri dell'equipaggio
Mentre Trump ufficializza le misure per rivitalizzare l'industria marittima americana, per i porti nazionali si prospetta un drastico calo del traffico
Washington/Ginevra
Okonjo-Iweala (WTO): con l'escalation delle tensioni commerciali tra USA e Cina lo scambio di merci tra le due economie potrebbe diminuire fino all'80%
CK Hutchison respinge le accuse di violazione del contratto di concessione dei porti panamensi di Cristóbal e Balboa
Panama
Panama Ports Company sottolinea di aver rispettato tutti gli obblighi di legge e gli impegni contrattuali
Gli USA non partecipano ai negoziati IMO sulla decarbonizzazione dello shipping e minacciano misure reciproche
Londra
Espressa contrarietà a qualsiasi tentativo di imporre misure economiche sulle navi basate sulle emissioni di gas ad effetto serra o sulla scelta del fuel
T&E sollecita il MEPC a concordare misure chiare e ambiziose per la decarbonizzazione dello shipping
Bruxelles
È necessario - sottolinea l'associazione - fissare obiettivi vincolanti
Meyer Yachts costruirà un mega yacht residenziale ultra-lusso per Ulyssia Residences
Miami
La nave sarà lunga 320 metri e verrà realizzata nel cantiere di Papenburg
Commessa da 1,3 miliardi di dollari del gruppo partenopeo Grimaldi per la costruzione di nove navi ro-pax
Commessa da 1,3 miliardi di dollari del gruppo partenopeo Grimaldi per la costruzione di nove navi ro-pax
Helsinki/Napoli
Ordine al cantiere China Merchants Jinling Shipyard (Weihai)
Viking ordina a Fincantieri due navi da crociera con opzione per ulteriori due unità
Los Angeles/Trieste
Le due navi in costruzione ad Ancona per il marchio americano saranno le prime al mondo alimentate a idrogeno stoccato a bordo
Federlogistica, il possibile collasso dell'autotrasporto è un rischio per il Paese
Genova/Modena
Ruote Libere denuncia che al governo basta stanziare un po' di fondi per non dover affrontare i veri problemi degli autotrasportatori
Lo scorso anno i ricavi del gruppo cinese CMPort sono aumentati del +3,1%
Hong Kong
Nei primi tre mesi del 2025 i terminal portuali hanno movimentato 36,4 milioni di container (+5,6%)
Approvati i rendiconti delle AdSP della Liguria Occidentale e del Tirreno Centro Settentrionale
Genova/Civitavecchia
Nei primi tre mesi del 2025 i ricavi di Konecranes sono aumentati del +7,7%
Helsinki
343 milioni di euro di nuovi ordini di mezzi portuali (+37,5%)
Primo trimestre di crescita per Kuehne+Nagel
Schindellegi
Il fatturato netto del gruppo logistico è ammontato a 6,33 miliardi di franchi svizzeri (+14,9%)
Istanza della TDT (gruppo Grimaldi) per la costruzione e gestione del 50% del Terminal Darsena Europa di Livorno
Livorno
La società ha chiesto l'estensione della durata dell'attuale concessione
Nel 2024 investiti 58 milioni per l'ammodernamento dei porti di Livorno, Piombino e dell'isola d'Elba
Livorno
Approvati il bilancio consuntivo e la relazione annuale dell'AdSP
Consulenza della BEI per rafforzare la resilienza climatica dei porti di Volos, Alessandropoli e Patrasso
Lussemburgo
Assisterà le autorità portuali nell'individuazione e nella gestione dei rischi climatici
Nel primo trimestre il porto di Valencia ha movimentato 1,3 milioni di container (+3,4%)
Valencia
Calo del traffico di transhipment
Il Comitato di gestione dell'AdSP del Tirreno Centrale ha approvato all'unanimità il bilancio consuntivo 2024
Napoli
SOS LOGistica acquisirà la qualifica di Ente del Terzo Settore
Milano
L'associazione conta oggi su 74 soci
Nei primi tre mesi del 2025 in calo il traffico delle merci nei porti di Barcellona e Algeciras
Barcellona/Algeciras
Hupac trasferisce su Novara il servizio intermodale con Padova
Chiasso
Sinora l'altro terminal era quello di Busto Arsizio
PSA SECH ha operato il primo treno da 400 metri al Parco Ferroviario Rugna
Genova
Capacità sino a 20 coppie di treni al giorno
Approvato all'unanimità il rendiconto di esercizio 2024 dell'AdSP della Liguria Orientale
La Spezia
In ultimazione la bonifica bellica propedeutica all'ampliamento del Terminal Ravano della Spezia
La Spezia
L'AdSP vi ha investito oltre 600mila euro
Francesco Rizzo designato alla presidenza dell'AdSP dello Stretto
Roma
Ha più volte denunciato l'inutilità della costruzione del ponte sullo Stretto
Aerei statunitensi hanno attaccato il porto yemenita di Ras Isa
Tampa/Beirut
38 morti e oltre cento feriti
Nel 2025 Stazioni Marittime prevede un rialzo del traffico dei traghetti e delle crociere nel porto di Genova
Rapporto del MIT sulla mobilità evidenzia un aumento della domanda sia passeggeri che merci
Roma
Nel primo trimestre il traffico delle merci nei porti russi è diminuito del -5,6%
San Pietroburgo
In calo sia le merci secche (-5,3%) che le rinfuse liquide (-5,8%)
Andrea Giachero è stato confermato presidente di Spediporto
Genova
Rinnovato anche il consiglio direttivo dell'associazione degli spedizionieri genovesi per il triennio 2025-2028
Studio per il monitoraggio del traffico veicolare nei porti di Venezia e Chioggia
Milano
Commessa aggiudicata a Circle e Arelogik
In Italia il settore del trasporto ferroviario delle merci è in profonda sofferenza
Ginevra
Fermerci invita a rendere strutturali e aumentare gli incentivi al traffico e a rifinanziare l'incentivo per l'acquisto di locomotive e carri
Rapporto del Global Maritime Forum sull'ottimizzazione degli scali delle navi per ridurre le emissioni
Copenaghen
Proposti gli approcci dell'arrivo virtuale e l'arrivo just-in-time
Nel primo trimestre di quest'anno il traffico dei container nel porto di Gioia Tauro è cresciuto del +15,5%
Gioia Tauro
Avviata la costruzione della “casa del portuale”
GNV ha preso in consegna in Cina la seconda di quattro nuove navi ro-pax
Genova
“GNV Orion” potrà ospitare 1.700 passeggeri e trasportare fino a 3.080 metri lineari di carico
Dopo dieci trimestri di flessione il traffico dei container nel porto di Hong Kong torna a crescere
Hong Kong
Nei primi tre mesi di quest'anno movimentati 3,39 milioni di teu (+2,1%)
Fincantieri acquisisce una quota in WSense
Roma
Consegnata alla Marina Militare italiana la nona unità FREMM “Spartaco Schergat”
Presentata la nuova edizione del Manuale pratico dei traffici marittimi
Genova
Redatto da Assagenti, compie cinquant'anni
Nel primo trimestre il traffico dei container nei porti di Long Beach e Los Angeles è aumentato del +26,6% e +5,2%
Long Beach/Los Angeles
Prossimo l'impatto dei dazi introdotti da Trump
Nei primi tre mesi del 2025 il porto di Singapore ha movimentato 10,5 milioni di container (+5,8%)
Singapore
In peso il traffico containerizzato ha registrato un calo del -1,4%
Firmato il regolamento per il bunkeraggio di GNL presso lo stabilimento Fincantieri di Genova
Genova
Definite le modalità di trasferimento del carburante da nave a nave
Gli storici marchi cantieristici Uljanik e 3.Maj verso l'estinzione
Zagabria
Lo Stato conferma l'intenzione di cedere le attività navalmeccaniche nei due siti di Pola e Fiume
Cambiaso Risso ha concluso l'acquisizione della francese Somecassur
Genova
L'azienda transalpina è specializzata nell'assicurazione di super e mega yacht
Nuovo servizio ferroviario settimanale tra il porto di Gioia Tauro e Verona
Gioia Tauro/Verona
Operato da Medlog per il trasporto di merci refrigerate
LA BERS alla ricerca di un partner strategico per lo sviluppo del porto fluviale moldavo di Giurgiulesti
Londra
Lanciata una gara internazionale
PROSSIME PARTENZE
Visual Sailing List
Porto di partenza
Porto di destinazione:
- per ordine alfabetico
- per nazione
- per zona geografica
I porti turchi hanno segnato il nuovo record di traffico delle merci relativo al primo trimestre
Ankara
Picco storico dei carichi importati dall'estero
Nel primo trimestre del 2025 il traffico delle merci nel porto di Taranto è cresciuto del +37,6%
Taranto
Aumento di 854mila tonnellate delle rinfuse solide e di 265mila tonnellate delle merci convenzionali
DEME compra la Havfram, società che installa parchi eolici offshore
Zwijndrecht/Washington
Transazione del valore di circa 900 milioni di euro
Avviati da Reggio Calabria i trasporti ferroviari dei convogli per la Metro di Roma
Roma
Commessa aggiudicata da Hitachi Rail a Mercitalia Rail
Nel 2024 i volumi movimentati da Magli Intermodal Service sono diminuiti del -2%
Rezzato
Stabile il fatturato
A marzo Yang Ming registra la prima flessione del fatturato dopo 14 mesi di crescita
Keelung/Taipei
Prosegue l'aumento dei ricavi di Evergreen e WHL
La Commissione Europea ha approvato l'acquisizione della tedesca Schenker da parte della danese DSV
Bruxelles
L'impatto sulla concorrenza nei mercati in cui le due aziende operano è ritenuto limitato
Accordo Fincantieri - Kayo per promuovere lo sviluppo dell'industria cantieristica e navale in Albania
Trieste
Possibile creazione di un polo per la costruzione e il refitting navale nella regione
Recente lieve riduzione dei costi della logistica degli autoveicoli nuovi di fabbrica
Bruxelles
Montaresi (AdSP Liguria Orientale) premiata con l'“Oscar dei Porti”
Miami
L'evento è giunto alla diciottesima edizione
Nei primi tre mesi del 2025 i container trasportati dalle navi della OOCL sono aumentati del +9,3%
Hong Kong
Ricavi in crescita del +16,8%
L'AdSP dei Mari Tirreno Meridionale e Ionio vince in appello contro la Zen Yacht
Gioia Tauro
L'azienda condannata al pagamento dei canoni arretrati
Nel porto di Livorno è stato sequestrato un ingente carico di cocaina
Livorno
Due tonnellate di droga individuate dal personale delle Dogane e della Guardia di Finanza
Navantia rinnova l'accordo con il gruppo crocieristico americano Royal Caribbean
Miami
Sinora il cantiere di Cadice ha effettuato lavori di manutenzione, riparazione e ristrutturazione su 45 navi del gruppo
Quest'anno è atteso un traffico record delle crociere nei porti italiani
Miami
Cemar ritiene che la crescita non si arresterà neanche nel 2026
Accordo HII-HHI per accelerare la produzione navale americana e sudcoreana
National Harbor
L'obiettivo è di rafforzare la base industriale navale delle due nazioni
La Panama Ports Company accusata di aver violato i termini del contratto di concessione
Panama
Il revisore generale dei conti panamense ha annunciato la presentazione di accuse penali
È diventato operativo il Colombo West International Terminal
Ahmedabad
Ha una capacità di traffico pari a 3,2 milioni di teu
Lunedì a Genova si terrà il convegno “I nuovi combustibili marini sostenibili - Decarbonize Shipping”
Genova
Completata nel porto di Gioia Tauro la nuova struttura polifunzionale di controllo frontaliera PCF - Punto PED/PDI
Gioia Tauro
Venerdì a Roma il convegno “L'Intelligenza Artificiale arriva in porto”
Roma
È promosso dall'Unione Nazionale Imprese Portuali
Inaugurato a Miami il nuovo terminal crociere del gruppo MSC
Miami
Può ospitare in contemporanea tre navi di grandi dimensioni
A febbraio il traffico nel porto di Ravenna è cresciuto del +2,1%
Ravenna
Aumento delle rinfuse e calo delle merci varie
Nel 2024 Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane ha registrato una perdita netta di -208 milioni di euro
Roma
Ricavi in crescita del +11,7%. In aumento le merci trasportate dal gruppo grazie all'acquisizione di Exploris
Porto di Genova, Ente Bacini chiede nuovi spazi e il rinnovo della concessione
Genova
Convegno per celebrare il centenario della società
Il 19 giugno a Roma si terrà l'assemblea pubblica dell'Associazione Italiana Terminalisti Portuali
Genova
VARD costruirà una nave per operazioni subacquee offshore per Dong Fang Offshore
Ålesund/Trieste
Il contratto ha un valore di 113,5 milioni di euro
PORTI
Porti italiani:
Ancona Genova Ravenna
Augusta Gioia Tauro Salerno
Bari La Spezia Savona
Brindisi Livorno Taranto
Cagliari Napoli Trapani
Carrara Palermo Trieste
Civitavecchia Piombino Venezia
Interporti italiani: elenco Porti del mondo: mappa
BANCA DATI
ArmatoriRiparatori e costruttori navali
SpedizionieriProvveditori e appaltatori navali
Agenzie marittimeAutotrasportatori
MEETINGS
Lunedì a Genova si terrà il convegno “I nuovi combustibili marini sostenibili - Decarbonize Shipping”
Genova
Si svolgerà nella sede della Capitaneria di Porto di Genova
Venerdì a Roma il convegno “L'Intelligenza Artificiale arriva in porto”
Roma
È promosso dall'Unione Nazionale Imprese Portuali
››› Archivio
RASSEGNA STAMPA
Proposed 30% increase for port tariffs to be in phases, says Loke
(Free Malaysia Today)
Damen Mangalia Unionists Protest Friday Against Possible Closure
(The Romania Journal)
››› Archivio
FORUM dello Shipping
e della Logistica
Relazione del presidente Nicola Zaccheo
Roma, 18 settembre 2024
››› Archivio
La settimana prossima i porti italiani parteciperanno alla Seatrade Cruise Global
Roma
Marchio dell'iniziativa: “CruiseItaly - One Country, Many Destinations”
Inaugurato ufficialmente il terminal crociere del gruppo MSC nel porto di Barcellona
Barcellona
Nel 2027 sarà dotato di un impianto di cold ironing
Marcegaglia e Nova Marine Carriers costituiscono la joint venture NovaMar Logistic
Lugano/Gazoldo degli Ippoliti
Una general cargo trasporterà le materie prime agli stabilimenti del gruppo siderurgico
Liebherr registra un fatturato annuale record nel segmento delle gru per il settore marittimo-portuale
Bulle
Forte domanda di mezzi per l'industria offshore e per la movimentazione dei container
A Genova il convegno annuale “Programmazione, Esercizio e Gestione di Reti di Trasporto”
Genova
È dedicato al settore dei trasporti e della mobilità
Lo scorso anno sono state 656 le navi sottoposte a lavori di riparazione in Grecia
Il Pireo
Incremento di cinque unità rispetto al 2023
Porto della Spezia, completate le simulazioni di accosto delle navi da crociera al molo Garibaldi Ovest
La Spezia
Convegno di Assagenti sul futuro della professione di agente e mediatore marittimo
Genova
Si terrà domani a Genova
Stena Line presenta il progetto di una nave ro-ro in grado di ridurre il consumo di energia di almeno il 20%
Goteborg
Introdotte gran parte delle tecnologie innovative attualmente disponibili
Francesco Beltrano è il nuovo segretario generale di Uniport
Roma
Subentra a Paolo Ferrandino, che continuerà a collaborare come consulente
Saipem si è aggiudicata nuovi contratti in Medio Oriente e in Guyana
Milano
L'importo complessivo delle commesse è di circa 720 milioni di dollari
Convegno a Genova per il centenario di Ente Bacini
Genova
La società è stata istituita il 19 febbraio 1925
Rinnovato il consiglio di amministrazione di Interporto Bologna
Bentivoglio
Stefano Caliandro nominato presidente. Perdita di 1,7 milioni di euro nel 2024
NYK investe 76 miliardi di yen nella NYK Energy Ocean Corporation
Tokyo
La newco ha rilevato le attività della ENEOS Ocean
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